Recent Developments in Regional Air Carrier Litigation and the Carriers\u27 Exposure to Punitive Damages under Supreme Court Precedent by Baumeister, Michel F. & Capone, Dorothea M.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 75 | Issue 2 Article 2
2010
Recent Developments in Regional Air Carrier
Litigation and the Carriers' Exposure to Punitive
Damages under Supreme Court Precedent
Michel F. Baumeister
Dorothea M. Capone
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michel F. Baumeister et al., Recent Developments in Regional Air Carrier Litigation and the Carriers' Exposure to Punitive Damages under
Supreme Court Precedent, 75 J. Air L. & Com. 323 (2010)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol75/iss2/2
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGIONAL AIR CARRIER
LITIGATION AND THE CARRIERS' EXPOSURE TO





S EVEN OF THE last eight crashes involving domestic air carri-ers that resulted in passenger fatalities involved commuter or
regional airlines.' Although the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) called for "a single level of safety across the aviation
industry in 1997,"2 in reality, the operational differences be-
* A renowned trial attorney for more than 35 years, Mitch Baumeister has
concentrated his practice in the field of aviation accident and complex tort
litigation. Mitch's career has been dedicated to helping air crash victims and
their families receive proper and adequate compensation, as well as to making
improvements in aviation safety. He has served as a leading member of the
Plaintiffs Steering and Executive Committees formed in every major airline
disaster in which the firm has represented victims and their families.
Mitch was named a 2009 Trial Lawyer of the Year by the Public Justice
Foundation for his work as a lead attorney in the deadly December 21, 1988
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in which more than
$500 million was recovered from the airline's insurers and an unprecedented
$2.7 billion dollars was paid by the Libyan government to the victim's families.
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been involved in every major case handled by the firm.
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1 Andy Pasztor & Susan Carey, Commuter Airlines: Questions of Safety, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 1, 2009, at Al.
2 Id. The Single Level of Safety FAA directive is also known as the "Commuter
Rule." See Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, Supplemental, Commuter,
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tween the major carriers and those of the regional operators
stand in stark contrast to that mandate.3 Safety-related incidents
and deadly crashes, including many in which flight crews lost
situational awareness, occur significantly more often at regional
airlines flying turbo-propeller and smaller jet aircraft than at
major air carriers flying largerjets.4 One reason for the discrep-
ancy between regional and major air carriers is relatively simple
but probably shocking to the uneducated flying public. Some of
the most difficult flying is being done by regional airline pilots
who often have the least amount of flying experience.' As re-
cently as eight to nine years ago, regional carriers such as Pinna-
cle Airlines required pilots to have at least 1,500 hours of flight
time prior to being hired.' When the major carriers' demand
for service grew and competition amongst regional airlines for
that business increased, Pinnacle, like many other regional oper-
ators, cut its requirements for new hires to 250 hours.' Other
carriers sought to fill pilot voids by seeking out new hires from
flight schools that are unaccredited or those that had a history
of fines and infractions in connection with their training, and/
or record-keeping practices.' Another factor contributing to
the disparities in safety-related crashes and incidents is the fact
that regional air carriers operate shorter routes.' As a result,
their pilots may be required to takeoff and land, the most diffi-
cult parts of any flight, as many as six or eight times in a twenty-
four hour period.1 0 Additionally, due to the typically short flight
duration, regional pilots are often required to fly through diffi-
and On-Demand Operations: Editorial and Other Changes, 62 Fed. Reg. 13248,
13248 (Mar. 19, 1997) (codified at 14 C.F.R. Part 119). This rule required all 14
C.F.R. Part 135 operators to transition to the safety standards set out in 14 C.F.R.
Part 121 by Mar. 20, 1997. See id.
3 Pasztor & Carey, supra note 1.
4 Id.; see also Press Release, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., SV-09-13, Aviation Acci-
dent Statistics for 2008, Show 'Mixed Picture' (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://
www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2009/090402b.html.





10 See discussion infra, Part C.I., regarding the crash of Corporate Airlines
Flight 5966. The flight crew operating that aircraft was originally scheduled for
eight flights on the day of the crash. See NAT'L TRANsP. SAFErv BD., AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT REPORT, NTSB/AAR-06/01, PB2006-9104016 (2004), available at http:/
/www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2006/AARO601.pdf.
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cult weather conditions unlike pilots flying larger jet aircraft
who have the luxury of flying above rain, ice, or snow.1'
Regional airline scheduling practices also impact the ability of
pilots to safely operate their aircraft.12 Since these carriers typi-
cally fly passengers from smaller regional airports' 3 to an air-
line's hub location, many flights are set to depart in the pre-
dawn hours to meet transfer connections and land back at the
regional airports late at night after having connected through
larger hub airports. Many regional pilots commute to duty ba-
ses to report for work by first flying in from their homes, which
are typically located hours away.' 4 Pilot fatigue leading to a lack
of situational awareness has been cited as a contributing factor
in many recent commuter airline crashes.' 5 Finally, regional air-
lines compensate their pilots with a shockingly low rate of
hourly pay, in some instances paying first officers sitting in the
right seat of their planes less than $25,000 per year.'" It is pain-
fully obvious that this level of compensation, which is somewhat
equivalent to workers employed in the fast-food industry, does
not permit pilots to maintain "crash pads" near their bases of
operation, which was common practice during the 1970s, '80s,
and '90s.17 While all of these are critical issues that the industry
and governmental regulators must address, the real question is
what precipitated these issues. The short answer, unfortunately,
is economics.'"
The Regional Airline Association-the business interest and
lobbying arm of the commuter segment of the aviation indus-
try-reports that the number of passengers flown by regional
carriers increased from approximately 82 million in 2000 to 159
million in 2008,19 comprising more than 50% of all domestic
11 Pasztor & Carey, supra note 1.
12 Dan Weikel, Are Pilots Flying Beyond Their Limits?, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 17, 2010, at
B1.
13 Pasztor & Carey, supra note 1.
14 Weikel, supra note 12.
15 See Stephanie Chen, Pilot Fatigue is Like 'Having too Much to Drink', CNN.com,
May 15, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/05/15/pilot.fatigue.buffalo.
crash/index.html.
16 See Pasztor & Carey, supra note 1. See also Joshua Rhett Miller, Low Pay One of
Many Difficulties Facing Regional Pilots, Fox NEWS, May 13, 2009, http://foxnews.
com/story/0,2933,520097,00.html.
17 See generally Steve Dennis, Crash Pads!, AIRLINERS.NET, Aug. 28, 2006, http://
www.airliners.net/aviation-articles/read.main?id=97.
18 See, e.g., Weikel, supra note 12.
19 Regional Airline Association, 10-Year Industry Statistics, http://www.raa.
org/portals/0/industrystats/trafficstatistics.png (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
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airline flights.2 o As of July 2009, the regional airlines' fleet of
aircraft included more than 2,400 turbo propeller and jet air-
craft, carrying an average of 54 passengers per flight in 2008.21
These carriers service more than 650 U.S. airports, including
476 where only regional air service is available.2 2 The excep-
tional growth in regional airlines over the last decade has arisen
as the major air carriers sought out new ways of doing busi-
ness.2 ' By outsourcing flights to regional carriers, the major air-
lines are able to substantially lower their operational costs. 2 4
The major carriers market and sell tickets under their own
brand and generally retain the revenue received from ticket
sales.25 To provide the actual flights, they enter into contracts
with regional operators to service particular airports or routes,
paying the regional operators for these services under the terms
of contractual agreements. 26 While this type of operation may
benefit the carriers, it has left the flying public seriously at risk.2 7
Discussed below are a number of air disasters involving re-
gional carriers that have revealed the many deficiencies and fail-
ures inherent under the current regime.28
20 See Regional Airline Association, RAA-Home, www.raa.org (last visited Apr.
9, 2010).
21 RAA 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 13, 15, available at http://www.raa.org/portals/
0/pubs/AR2009LR.pdf.
22 Id. at 13.
23 See, e.g., Julie Johnson, American to Outsource at O'Hare, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21,
2010, at Bl; Safety Risks at Regional Airlines Detailed by PBS, NPR, Feb. 9, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=123496427.
24 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 23.
25 NPR, supra note 23.
26 Weikel, supra note 12.
27 See NPR, supra note 23.
28 For brevity, this article takes an in depth look at only a few of the deadly
regional airline air disasters that have taken place in this country over the last
twenty or so years. It is important to remember, however, that while only a few
are detailed here, many more people have lost their lives as a result of the actions
of inexperienced or fatigued pilots, inappropriately matched flight crews, inade-
quate or deficient training by airline management, lack of appropriate corporate
safety cultures, lax hiring practices, and many other factors that contribute to the
differences in the operations of regional air carriers and major airlines. There
are a number of examples of other air crashes that resulted from the same pat-
terns. Northwest Airlink Flight 5719, operated by Express Airlines II, crashed
trying to land at Hibbing, Minnesota on December 1, 1993, and killed all eigh-
teen persons on board (crash was result of failure in crew coordination and loss
of situational awareness with respect to altitude during night instrument land-
ing). See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Accident Brief, DCA94MAO22, http://www.
ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?evid=20001211Xi3847&key=1. United Express Flight
6291, operated by Atlantic Coast Airlines, crashed at Columbus, Ohio on January
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A. AMERICAN EAGLE FLIGHT 4184
On October 31, 1994, at approximately 4:00 p.m. C.S.T., a
Simmons Airlines ATR 72 propeller aircraft being operated as
American Eagle Flight 4184 crashed near Roselawn, Indiana,
during a rapid descent after an uncommanded roll excursion,
killing all sixty-four passengers and four crew members on
board.2 9 With the first officer flying, the plane had departed
from Indianapolis, Indiana, headed to O'Hare International
Airport in Chicago, Illinois.so Shortly after take off, the pilots
engaged the autopilot and continued to climb until reaching
approximately 16,000 feet before leveling off."1 During level
flight, reports were made by other pilots of freezing rain and
icing conditions at approximately 12,000 feet along the route of
flight, but there was no acknowledgment of this information by
the flight crew.3 The plane descended to approximately 10,000
feet when it was put into an initial holding pattern, and the air-
craft's deicing system was activated."3 While in this holding pat-
tern, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) noted "sounds of music
7, 1994, and resulted in the deaths of three flight crew and two passengers (crash
was attributed to flight crew's failure to monitor airspeed or appropriately re-
spond to stall warning; captain had low time and experience and was paired with
first officer with no airline experience in air carrier operations). See Nat'l Transp.
Safety Bd., Accident Brief, DCA94MAO27, http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?
ev_id=20001206X00616&key=1. Northwest Airlink Flight 3701, operated by a
two-person Pinnacle Airline flight crew, crashed in a residential area in Jefferson
City, Missouri on October 14, 2004 (ferry flight where reckless conduct of the
crew who ignored multiple cockpit warnings and pushed the plane past its oper-
ating capabilities killing themselves and destroying the aircraft). SeeNat'l Transp.
Safety Bd., Accident Brief, DCAO5MA003, http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?
evid=20041015X01633&key=1. Delta Connection Flight 6448, operated by Shut-
tle America, skidded off the runway and crashed through a fence while landing at
Cleveland International Airport on February 18, 2007, injuring three passengers
(pilot advised federal investigators that the flight was his third of the day, and he
was not at the "best of his game" because of a lack of sleep). See Nat'l Transp.
Safety Bd., Accident Brief, DCA07MAO72, http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?
evid=20070223X00215bkey=1; Alan Levin, Concerns Arise Over Regional Airlines,
USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/
2008-02-06-regionalsafetyN.htm.
29 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFEY BD., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT, NTSB/AAR-9601,
PB96-910401, DCA95MAO01 1, 15 (1996), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Pub
lictn/1996/aar9601.pdf. Details describing the crash of American Eagle Flight
4184 and the factors that led to it are described at length in the Aircraft Accident
Report prepared by the NTSB, adopted July 9, 1996. See generally id.
3 Id. at 1-2.
31 Id. at 3.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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playing in the first officer's headset" and the entry of one of the
flight attendants into the cockpit, where she remained for more
than fifteen minutes. 4 The CVR indicated that throughout this
time, the pilots were engaged in non-pertinent conversation
with the flight attendant.15 After she left the cockpit, the pilots
continued to engage in non-pertinent discussions, some of
which involved their encounter with the flight attendant." A
few minutes later, the captain left the cockpit to use the rest-
room.3 7 He returned a short time later but did not inquire as to
the status of the icing conditions or the aircraft's deicing sys-
tem."3 Following instructions received from local-sector air traf-
fic control, the flight crew configured the autopilot to descend
to approximately 8,000 feet to enter another hold.39 Descend-
ing through 9,130 feet, data retrieved from the plane's flight
data recorder (FDR) revealed that the ailerons began slowly de-
flecting to a right-wing down position and then rapidly deflected
to 13.43 degrees right-wing down, almost reaching the maxi-
mum design deflection of 14 degrees in either direction from
neutral.40 The plane stopped rolling at 77 degrees right-wing
down and 6,000 feet altitude before appearing to respond to the
pilots input made through the control column.4 ' As the aircraft
began to roll back to the left towards a wings-level position, the
ailerons again deflected rapidly to a right-wing down position.4 2
This time the plane rolled to the right in excess of 50 degrees
per second, completing a full roll and ultimately crashing vio-
lently into a field.
As part of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) concluded that the probable cause of the crash
was the pilots' loss of control which was attributed to the sudden
aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice
accreted beyond the plane's deicing boots. 4 4 Although investi-
gators were critical of the aircraft manufacturer for failing to
provide adequate information to operators or include informa-
34 Id. at 3, 6.
3 Id. at 4, 6.
36 Id. at 6, 7.
3 Id. at 7.
3 Id.
3 Id. at 159.
40 Id. at 8 & n.16.
41 Id. at 8, 11.
42 Id. at 8.
4s Id. at 8, 12.
44 Id. at 210.
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tion in their manuals as to previously known effects of freezing
precipitation on the plane's stability and control characteristics,
they also concluded that deficiencies in the airline's flight crew
training procedures and the flight crew's sterile cockpit viola-
tions, which had distracted them and led to their lack of situa-
tional awareness, were contributing factors to the deadly crash. 5
B. COMAIR FLIGHT 3272
At 3:54 p.m. E.S.T. on January 9, 1997, an Embraer EMB 120
Brasilia aircraft being operated as Comair Flight 3272, traveling
from the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport
to the Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport, crashed
into a field in Monroe, Michigan, approximately nineteen miles
from its destination after experiencing an uncommanded in-
flight roll.16 All twenty-six passengers, two flight-crew members,
and a flight attendant were killed in the crash.4 7 The first officer
was performing the pilot-flying duties during the flight, which
was conducted during light snow and icing conditions."8 Al-
though the flight was of a very short duration, after the initial
climb out of Cincinnati, the autopilot was engaged, and the cap-
tain requested and received approval to depart from their as-
signed altitude of 19,000 to 21,000 to avoid turbulence they
were experiencing at the lower level. 4 9 Less than fifteen minutes
later, the pilots were instructed by air traffic control to descend
to 11,000 feet and enter the approach pattern to the Detroit
airport. 0 Five minutes later, Detroit terminal radar approach
control (TRACON) instructed the flight crew to reduce their
airspeed to 190 knots and descend to 7,000 feet.5 1 During this
descent, the flight crew was engaged in non-pertinent conversa-
tion unrelated to their flight duties. At approximately 8,600
feet, the first officer finally called for the descent checklist,
4 Id. at 205-06, 208-10.
46 NAT'L TRANsp. SAFEYr BD., AIRCRAr ACCIDENT REPORT, NTSB/AAR-98/04,
PB98-910404, DCA97MA017 1, 15 (1998), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Pub
lictn/1998/aar9804body.pdf. Details describing the crash of Comair Flight
3272 and the factors that contributed to it are described at length in the Aircraft
Accident Report prepared by the NTSB, adopted November 4, 1998. See generally
id.
47 Id. at 1.
- Id. at 1-2.
4 Id. at 2, 4.
5o Id. at 2.
5' Id. at 2.
52 Id.
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which, according to Comair policy, was required to be per-
formed before the aircraft had descended below 10,000 feet. 3
The descent checklist included an ice-protection prompt that
was required to be accomplished before the airplane entered
icing conditions.5 4 Two seconds later, the first officer began the
approach briefing although neither pilot called for the ap-
proach checklist.55 An abbreviated briefing stating the air-
plane's approach reference airspeed, takeoff safety airspeed and
final segment airspeeds was made by the captain as part of the
approach checklist, although the two final items-notifying the
flight attendants and "flaps-15/15/checked"-were not
56given.
Seconds later, Detroit TRACON instructed the pilots to enter
into a right turn and reduce their airspeed to 170 knots, and the
captain acknowledged the instruction.5 7 A minute later, the fi-
nal approach controller instructed them to reduce their air-
speed and descend to 6,000 feet.5 8 Two minutes later, they were
cleared to descend to 4,000 feet.5 9 During this time, the CVR
recorded air traffic controllers' conversations with an Airbus
A320 that was vectored ahead of Comair Flight 3272 discussing
windshear, tailwinds aloft, and pilot reports of slick runways and
low visibilities due to weather conditions at Detroit Airport.60
Another minute passed, and the final approach controller in-
structed the pilots to adjust their heading and reduce their air-
speed to 150 knots, and the captain acknowledged these
instructions.6 1 The flight crew failed to immediately implement
these instructions, and fifteen seconds later the controller was
required to repeat them before they were acknowledged by the
captain. Over the next several seconds, the pilots engaged in a
non-pertinent dialogue, which was interrupted by the final-ap-
proach controller amending the heading instruction he gave
the flight crew by ninety degrees to adjust the separation be-
53 Id. at 3 & n.5.
54 Id. at 3.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 3 & nn. 8-9. Data obtained from the CVR and FDR and physical evi-
dence at the accident site "indicated that the flaps were in the retracted position
when the accident occurred." Id. at 3 n.9.
57 Id. at 3.
5 Id. at 4.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2, 4, 206.
61 Id. at 4.
62 Id.
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tween it and the Airbus A320.6 This change was acknowledged
by the captain. 4
Data from the FDR indicated that the aircraft was at approxi-
mately 4,000 feet and began a left turn a few seconds after the
captain's acknowledgment. 6 Five seconds later, at an airspeed
of 156 knots, the airplane's roll attitude steepened to approxi-
mately 23 degrees of left bank, and the control wheel position
began to move back to the right even though the airplane's left
roll attitude continued to steepen. 6 6 Whirring noises were
heard on the CVR, and five seconds later the captain stated,
"Looks like your low speed indicator."6 7 Three seconds later he
stated: "Power."6 8 FDR data indicated that at this time the air-
plane was at an airspeed of 146 knots, the left bank angle was
steepening beyond 45 degrees, and the autopilot discon-
nected. 69 The CVR recorded a sound similar to the stickshaker
starting.7 0 Less than two seconds after the autopilot discon-
nected, the plane's control-wheel position moved from 18 de-
grees right to 19 degrees left, the roll attitude increased from
about 45 degrees left bank to about 140 degrees left bank, and
the pitch attitude decreased from nearly 2 degrees nose up to
about 17 degrees nose down.7 1 They crashed into the ground
several seconds later.
While the NTSB's investigation revealed a number of failures
on the part of the FAA, including a "failure to establish ade-
quate aircraft certification standards for flight in icing condi-
tions . . . which led to the loss of control when the airplane
accumulated a thin, rough accretion of ice on its lifting sur-
faces," the actions of the flight crew and Comair's management
were determined to be significant factors that contributed to the





67 Id. at 4-5.





73 Id. at vii. The NTSB noted that Comair's management failed "to establish
and adequately disseminate unambiguous minimum airspeed values for flap con-
figurations and for flight in icing conditions," and was critical of its pilot training
practices. Id.
331
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cussion between the pilots pertaining to the activation of the
aircraft's deice system, and it is probable that it was never turned
on.7 4 The flight crew was distracted by non-essential conversa-
tion during sterile cockpit and was inattentive to the fact that
their cockpit instruments indicated that the aircraft was accumu-
lating ice, causing it to slow to a dangerous level.7 5 Further-
more, it is apparent that the flight crew was not aware that the
flaps were retracted, and they apparently did not notice that the
control wheel was tilting to the right while the aircraft was in a
slow left hand turn. 6 Finally, their conduct, like that of the
flight crew operating American Eagle Flight 4184, in relying on
the aircraft's autopilot system instead of hand-flying the aircraft
while in dangerous icing conditions was a factor in causing both
crashes.7
C. CORPORATE AIRLINES 5966
On October 19, 2004, at approximately 7:37 p.m. C.S.T., the
pilots operating Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 for the Ameri-
can-Connection network of American Airlines attempted to
land their sixth flight of the day after more than fourteen hours
of duty time. They were joking with one another while under
sterile cockpit restrictions about co-workers and what to eat for
dinner when the aircraft crashed into trees during final ap-
proach and short of its intended arrival runway.78 The BAE Jet-
stream 32 twin-engine turboprop had departed from
Lambert-St. Louis International Airport in St. Louis, Missouri,
and was bound for Kirksville Regional Airport in Kirksville, Mis-
souri, carrying several physicians from across the country who
were scheduled to attend a seminar at a local university.79
When the aircraft was approximately twenty-three minutes
from the Kirksville Airport and flying at 12,000 feet, the CVR
disclosed that the pilots received weather information which in-
dicated four miles visibility in mist with an overcast ceiling at 300
74 Id. at 3 n.7.
75 Id. at 176, 178, 191-94.
76 Id. at vii, 3 n.9, 21, 178-79.
77 Compare id. at 178-79, with NAT'L TRANsp. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT
REPORT, supra note 10, at 8.
78 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 10, at 1, 6,
47, 10 n.33. Details describing the crash of Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 and
the factors that contributed to it are described at length in the Aircraft Accident
Report prepared by the NTSB, adopted Jan. 24, 2006. See generally id.
79 Id. at 1, 12.
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feet.80 The pilots discussed and acknowledged the dreary condi-
tions and expressed reservations about being able to land with-
out an instrument landing system."' Three minutes later, the
Kansas City air-route traffic control center cleared them to de-
scend to 8,000 feet at their discretion, which the flight crew ac-
knowledged. A few minutes later, they again listened to
weather information, which downgraded the visibility to three
miles, and the captain responded that the conditions were "go-
ing down the tubes."8 3
At approximately 7:21 p.m., the plane descended through
10,000 feet, triggering sterile cockpit conditions, and the con-
trol center cleared them to descend and maintain 3,000 feet.84
The pilots acknowledged the clearance and discussed the possi-
bility of shooting a missed approach.85 As they descended into
the top of the clouds at approximately 7:25 p.m., they joked
about the weather conditions, and the CVR recorded a yawn by
the first officer." A few minutes later, they again listened to the
weather conditions, which had not changed, and the captain re-
marked that conditions were "right where you don't want it."87
By 7:30 p.m., they were advised by the control center to adjust
their heading and maintain an altitude of 3,000 feet until they
were established on the localizer, and then were cleared for the
localizer approach to runway 36 at Kirksville Airport.8
Less than a minute later, the captain confirmed with the first
officer that they could descend to 2,500 feet in the approach,
then asked him to extend the landing gear, select 20 degrees of
flap, and perform the landing checklist. 9 At approximately
7:33 p.m., the first officer keyed the microphone to activate the
pilot-controlled runway lights at Kirksville Airport.90 When the
plane crossed the final approach fix at 7:35 p.m., FDR data
showed the aircraft was at 2,500 mean sea level (msl), and the
first officer advised the captain that they could descend to 1,320
80 Id. at 1.
81 Id. at 1-2.




86 Id. at 3. This particular yawn was one of five recorded by the CVR by both
pilots during the short flight. Id. at 3 n.16.
87 Id. at 3.
8 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 3-4.
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feet msl, which is the minimum descent altitude for the ap-
proach.9 Radar and calculated FDR data indicates that from
this time until the crash, the aircraft was descending about 1,200
feet per minute. At 7:36 p.m., as the airplane descended
through 1,600 feet msl, the first officer stated, "'five hundred,
four hundred to go."9 3 Seventeen seconds later as they de-
scended through approximately 1,450 feet msl (about 500 feet
above ground level), the CVR recorded a mechanical announce-
ment of "five hundred" from the plane's ground proximity
warning system (GPWS).94 The CVR recorded cursing between
the pilots who apparently did not know where they were." Ten
seconds later, while apparently searching for the ground, the
captain asked "what do you think?," and the first officer re-
sponded that he did not see anything.9 6 Two seconds later, the
captain stated that he had the approach lights in sight while the
GPWS warned them they were at 200 feet above ground level
(agl)." During this exchange, the aircraft was descending
through about 1,160 feet msl, which is 160 feet below the mini-
mum descent altitude for the airport." Another ten seconds
elapsed, and the CVR recorded the GPWS sounding "sink rate,"
indicating that based upon the altitude and rate of descent, the
airplane had reached about 100 feet agl."9 The first sound of
the aircraft hitting the trees occurred about a second later.100
NTSB investigators determined that the probable cause of the
crash was "the pilots' failure to follow established procedures or
properly conduct a nonprecision [landing] approach at night in
instrument meteorological conditions," as well as their im-
proper "descent below the minimum descent altitude before re-
quired visual cues were available (which continued
unmoderated until the airplane struck the trees)" as well as
"their failure to adhere to the established division of duties be-




95 Id. Former NTSB Chair Mark Rosenker remarked that he was "extremely
disappointed in what I heard" on the CVR, noting that "from the beginning to
the end, it was unprofessional." Sara Kehaulani Goo, Poor Behavior, Fatigue Led to
'04 Plane Crash, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2006, at A02.
96 NAT'L TRANsp. SAriTv Bo., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
97 Id.
98 Id.
- Id. at 4 & n.20.
100 Id. at 4.
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tween the flying and non-flying (monitoring) pilot."101 The
Safety Board also cited the pilots' failure to make standard cal-
louts, their overall lack of professionalism, and their fatigue as
factors that contributed to the crash.1 0 2
D. COMAIR FLIGHT 5191
Shortly before sunrise on August 27, 2006, the flight crew of
Delta Connection Flight 5191, which was being operated by the
regional airline Comair, Inc. (Comair 5191), violated the clear-
ance they received from the tower controller at Blue Grass Air-
port in Lexington, Kentucky, to takeoff for Atlanta, Georgia,
from the 7,000 foot long runway 22.10o Instead, the pilots inex-
plicably turned their Bombardier CRJ-100 aircraft onto the dark,
unlit runway 26, which is only 3,500 feet long and restricted to
use by aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds operating
under daytime visual flight rules.10 4 Despite the fact that their
view from the cockpit window as they lined the aircraft up on
runway 26 was described as a "black hole,"10 the flight crew
seemed to have disregarded the absence of runway lighting, ig-
nored nine heading indications on their cockpit flight displays
which provided each of them with their exact heading, and also
failed to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the cor-
rect runway.10 6 Additionally, the pilots also missed several visual
cues outside of the cockpit that should have alerted them they
were attempting to takeoff from the wrong runway.107 These
signs included the painted runway numbers on the pavement
and various taxiway and runway signs on the airport surface.>1
In particular, the runway 26 hold-short position sign was clearly
visible from the cockpit as the crew engaged in non-pertinent
10 Id. at 58.
102 Id.
10 NAT'L TRANsp. SAFETY BD., AIRCRArr ACCIDENT REPORT, NTSB/AAR-07-05,
PB2007-910406 1, 16, 36 (2007), available at http://www.ntsb/gov/Publictn/
2007/AAR0705.pdf. Details describing the crash of Comair Flight 5191 and the
factors that led to it are described at length in the Aircraft Accident Report pre-
pared by the NTSB adopted and released to the public on July 26, 2007. See
generally id.
104 Id. at 1 & n.2, 16-17.
10 Id. at 26 n.94 (noting that members of NTSB "Operations/Human Per-
formance investigative team" conducting a nighttime taxi demonstration at the
Lexington Blue Grass Airport from a similar aircraft described the view from the
cockpit window as a "black hole" since the end of runway 26 was not visible).
10 Id. at 60, 62, 67, 79, 105.
107 Id. at 25-26.
108 Id.
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conversation while waiting on the taxiway for approximately 50
seconds before they continued their taxi and turned on to run-
way 26.109 With the first officer at the controls, the aircraft
rolled down the blackened runway and through the extremely
well-marked and illuminated intersection of runways 26/22.111
As they passed through and emerged beyond the intersection
and continued to roll on the totally dark runway 26, the first
officer noted "dat [sic] is weird . . . no lights.""' A few seconds
later, the captain responded, 'Yeah." 1 2 Lacking sufficient pave-
ment to facilitate a safe takeoff, the regional jet ran off the end
of the runway, struck an earthen berm, and became temporarily
airborne climbing less than 20 feet off the ground."' The plane
impacted several trees before crashing into a field adjacent to
the airport, killing all forty-seven of its passengers, two crew
members, and seriously injuring the first officer."
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the crash
was the flight crew's failure to use available cues and cockpit aids
to identify their aircraft's location on the airport surface during
taxi, and their failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane
was on the correct runway prior to attempting takeoff." A con-
tributing factor to the crash according to NTSB investigators was
the flight crew's repeated violation of sterile cockpit procedures
during taxi, which contributed to their loss of positional
awareness. 11 6
Sadly, the grossly negligent actions of the flight crew, which
caused the runway incursion and led to the deaths of all of the
passengers on board the plane, not only could have easily been
prevented, but were the foreseeable consequences of the reck-
less manner in which Comair management permitted its crews
to operate."' For example, the first officer, who was at the con-
trols as Comair Flight 5191 barreled down the wrong runway,
had purchased two beers from a hotel bar within twelve hours of
1-o Id. at 3, 25.
110 Id. at 4, 26.
n Id. at 4, 60, 157.
112 Id. at 4, 157.
113 Id. at 4.
114 Id. at 1, 4, 7.
115 Id. at 105.
116 Id. The NTSB also noted that the FAA's failure to mandate that all runway
crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control clearances may have
also contributed to the crash. Id.
117 Id. at 77; see, e.g., id. at 1, 38-39, 74 n.186, 124-38.
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his scheduled departure on August 27, 2006."" This purchase,
and apparent consumption, not only violated company policy,
but also demonstrated a complete lack of concern that the viola-
tion would be detected and punished by management.' 19 Since
Comair lacked any routinized process through which its pilots
received flight release paperwork, after the pilots checked in for
their flight that morning, they boarded the wrong airplane and
started its auxiliary power unit before being notified by ground
personnel of their error. 12 0 Both crew members repeatedly vio-
lated sterile cockpit procedures by engaging in inappropriate
non-essential conversation discussing their employment with
Comair, opportunities to fly for other airlines, and other per-
sonal matters, none of which were related to the safe prepara-
tion or operation of the flight. 1 2 1
Both members of the flight crew delivered what were charac-
terized by Comair's own management-level check airmen as de-
ficient and substandard mandatory briefings, disregarding
established procedures since there was little or no possibility
that their lax attitudes would be detected or reprimanded by
corporate management.1 2 2 The company's managers and of-
ficers recklessly failed to act upon the knowledge they had re-
ceived pertaining to runway incursions within the industry that
had led to serious crashes and loss of life.12 3 Even more shock-
ing was their failure to take appropriate steps to respond to an
incident in Corpus Christi, Texas, on January 2, 2003, in which
one of their own flight crews violated the takeoff clearance they
had received and recklessly departed from the wrong runway,
which, thankfully, was long enough to handle the takeoff so that
no lives were lost.124 Comair management deliberately chose
not to incorporate the specific recommendations that flight
crews confirm they are on the correct runway that were con-
tained in an FAA advisory circular published September 26,
2003,125 a few years before the crash.12 1 Management personnel
118 Id. at 4, 74 n.186.
119 Compare id. at 74 n.186, with id. at 38-39.
120 Id. at 1.
121 Id. at 124-38.
122 Id. at 58.
123 Id. at 43, 47.
124 Brandon Ortiz, Judge Rules on Comair Reports, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://www.airportbusiness.com/online/article.jsp?
siteSection=1&id=17703&pageNum=4.
125 NAT'L TRANsP. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 103, at
43. Acknowledging concern over an increase in runway incursions at airports
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also received reports and information from their corporate
safety department undeniably demonstrating a steady increase
in the number of runway incursions committed by their flight
crews during the two years preceding the crash, but failed to
dedicate the resources or implement actions to determine the
cause or stop the escalation."' Finally, in yet another example
of Comair management's reckless disregard for the safety of its
passengers, it failed to fill critical management positions within
the organization with competent, knowledgeable and skilled
managers and officers who possessed the background and expe-
rience necessary to coordinate the flow of information through-
out the organization, and completely failed to fill several
positions, including that of manager of flight safety, until the
week after the crash of Flight 5191.128
E. CONTINENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407
On February 12, 2009, shortly after 10:15 p.m. E.S.T, a Bom-
bardier Dash 8-Q400 aircraft, being operated by Colgan Air and
doing business as Continental Connection Flight 3407, in ice,
snow, and fog conditions crashed in Clarence Center, New York,
approximately five miles northeast of the Buffalo-Niagara Inter-
national airport during an instrument approach to Runway
23.129 All forty-five passengers, four crew members, and a man
in the living room of his home, which was destroyed by the
plane's impact, perished.1 3 o According to information con-
tained on the plane's digital flight data recorder (DFDR) and
the transcript of the CVR released by the NTSB in conjunction
throughout the country, the FAA issued AC 120-74A, which recommended that
air carriers add a number of runway verification measures to their standard oper-
ating procedures. Id. Included in AC 120-74A was a Standard Operating Proce-
dures Template for Group Operations and the Prevention of Runway Incursions,
which recommended that flight crews minimize "head's down" activities while
the aircraft is moving, as well as a specific recommendation for flight crews to
check to ensure "'that the compass heading approximately matches the runway
heading and taxiway orientation' to confirm proper runway or taxiway selection."
Id.
126 Compare id. at 1, with id. at 43.
127 Ortiz, supra note 124.
128 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY 1D., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 103, at
41.
129 NAT'L TRANsp. SAFETY 1D., OPERATIONs GROUP CHAIRMAN FACTUAL REPORT,
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with its preliminary investigation into the cause of the crash,13 1
seven minutes before the crash, the captain and first officer no-
ticed and commented on ice building up on the windscreen,
which began several minutes of non-pertinent discussion be-
tween them in which the first officer commented:
"I really wouldn't mind going through a winter in the northeast
before I have to upgrade to captain."
"I've never seen icing conditions. I've never been deiced. . . . I
don't want to have to experience that and make those kinds of
calls. You [sic] know I'dve freaked out. I'dve have like seen this
much ice and thought oh my gosh we were going to crash."s1 3
Approximately two minutes before the crash, the plane was
being flown on autopilot, its airspeed was 172 knots, and the
first officer deployed the flaps five degrees to facilitate the final
approach.'3 3 Less than a minute later, the flight crew extended
the landing gear.13 4 Twenty seconds later, the flaps were moved
to ten degrees, and two seconds after that movement, the stick
shaker activated causing the autopilot to disconnect. 1 3 5 Instead
of allowing the stick pusher to gently bring the nose of the air-
craft down to increase the air flow over the wings, the captain
improperly pulled back on the control column causing the
plane to pitch up and then roll to the left, then to the right.1 3 6
According to information extracted from the DFDR, the air-
131 The NTSB's preliminary hearings into the cause of the crash were held May
12-14, 2009. At the time of the writing of this article, the NTSB had not yet
concluded its investigation or released its final report. Details describing the
crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407 were obtained from materials
within the NTSB's docket. See NTSB: Docket Management System, http://www.
ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCAO9MA027/default.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2010).
132 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., COCKPIT VOICE REcORDER GROUP CHAIRMAN FAC-
TUAL REPORT ADDENDUM, Docket No. SA-531, Exhibit No. 2-B 12-105 (2009),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09MA027/423395.pdf.
These statements by the first officer took place at 22:11:54.3 and 22:12:05.0, re-
spectively. Id.
133 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., OPERATIONs GROUP CHAIRMAN FACTUAL REPORT,
supra note 129. The Buffalo Approach Control issued its last descent clearance to
Continental Connection Flight 3407 which was to 2,300 msl, approximately three
minutes before the crash. NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER
GROUP CHAIRMAN FACTUAL REPORT ADDENDUM, supra note 132, at 12-109.
134 NAT'L TRANsp. SAFETY BD., OPERATION GROUP CHAIRMAN FACTUAL REPORT,
supra note 129, at 3.
135 Id.
136 Id.; NTSB Abstract: Aircraft Accident Report, AAR-10/01, PB2010-910401,
http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm.
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speed continued to decrease to less than 100 knots.1 7 The air-
craft continued to pitch and roll and ultimately entered into "a
steep descent from which it did not recover" before impacting a
house on a residential street in Clarence Center, New York.1 38
In addition to the flight crew's failure to hand-fly the plane in
known icing conditions, their non-pertinent conversation below
10,000 feet is likely to have contributed to their overall lack of
situational awareness, causing them to be inattentive to the vari-
ous airspeed indicators available to them in the cockpit. The
captain's use of an improper technique to recover from the im-
pending stall, and many other factors are likely to have contrib-
uted to this most recent air disaster involving a regional air
carrier.'"' Sadly, many of these very same factors have also been
cited by the NTSB as contributing to previous regional airline
crashes. 40
It is obvious from the excerpted section of the CVR transcript
that the first officer lacked the level of experience that is needed
to safely transport fare-paying passengers in Part 121 operations.
Although she had accumulated approximately 2,200 total flight
hours, she had less than 800 in the Dash-8 Q400 aircraft and she
was paired with a captain who possessed roughly 1,000 as a pilot-
in-command overall, and only 110 in the Dash-8 Q400 air-
craft.141 This combined relative inexperience, coupled with the
first officer's naive understanding of the operation of the air-
craft in ice and snow was a recipe for disaster.
Pilot fatigue has played a role in many air crashes, and, as
discussed earlier, is particularly prevalent in regional airline op-
erations.' 4 2 It is probable that it also played a role in the crash
of Continental Connection Flight 3407. The first officer made
her home in Seattle, Washington, and commuted to her base of




10 See, e.g., NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., APPROACH AND LANDING ACCIDENT RE-
DUCTION: STERILE COCKPIT, FATIGUE, FAA SAFO 06004, Docket No. SA-531, Ex-
hibit No. 14-H 1 (2006), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/
DCA09MA027/417493.pdf.
1' NAT'L TRANsP. SAFETY BD., HUMAN PERFORMANCE GROUP CHAIRMAN FACTUAL
REPORT, Docket No. SA-531, Exhibit No. 14-A at 9 (2009), available at http://www
.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCAO9MAO27/418082.pdf.
142 Chen, supra note 15.
[75340
2010] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS - AIR CARRIER
operations in Newark, New Jersey.1 4 3 She awoke in Seattle on
the morning of February 11, 2009, and traveled from there to
Memphis, Tennessee, in a jumpseat on a Federal Express flight
that departed Seattle at approximately 8:00 p.m., arriving in
Memphis at 11:30 p.m. 4 4 She remained in the Federal Express
crew lounge for a few hours until she departed on another Fed-
eral Express flight that left Memphis at 4:18 a.m., arriving in
Newark at 6:23 a.m. on February 12, 2009, almost twenty-four
hours since she had last slept at home in Seattle."' She appar-
ently advised members of the Federal Express flight crew that
she intended to get some sleep in the crew lounge in Newark,
despite the fact that this was specifically prohibited by Colgan's
policies.146 NTSB investigators were unable to determine her ac-
tivities while in Newark, but did interview several pilots who re-
ported seeing her in the Colgan crew room watching television
and conversing with other pilots.147 Records obtained from her
cell phone revealed exchanges of text messages almost every
hour through late afternoon, as well as telephone calls with her
husband."
Other factors have been raised as possibly contributing to the
crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407.1" These include
Colgan's training policies and practices, its hiring practices, and
the penuriously low hourly rate-based compensation it pays its
pilots, particularly first officers just beginning their careers,
which is akin to fast-food workers, who do not have the safety of
dozens of people resting on their shoulders.1 50 Additionally,
Colgan's sick- and personal-leave policies may have prevented
143 NAT'L TRANsp. SAFE Y BD., HUMAN PERFORMANCE GROUP CHAIRMAN FACTUAL
REPORT, supra nOte 141.
1- Id. at 10-11.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 12.
147 Id.
14 See id.
149 NTSB Abstract: Aircraft Accident Report, supra note 136.
-so Nancy Cordes, Poor Training Cause of Buffalo Crash?, CBS EVENING NEWS,
Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/02/eveningnews/main
6167556.shtml; Jerry Zremski & Michael Beebe, Low Pay, Fatigue 'Recipe'for Crash;
Flight 3407 Families Outraged, BUFFALO NEWS, May 14, 2009, http://www.buffalo
news.com/2009/05/14/670974/low-pay-fatigue-recipe-for-crash.html. The NTSB
also noted that the first officer had moonlighted by working in a coffee shop
while employed by Colgan. See NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., HUMAN PERFORMANCE
GROUP CHAIRMAN FACTUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 9.
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the first officer, who was feeling ill, from being able to ask for a
day off.151
Many lawsuits arising out of the crash were originally filed in
the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York, which is located in Buffalo, New York, the flight's destina-
tion and home to many of its victims. These suits named Colgan
Air, Inc., Pinnacle Airlines Corp., Colgan's parent, and Conti-
nental Airlines, Inc. as defendants. In some instances, Bombar-
dier Aerospace Corporation was also named as a defendant.
Several other cases were originally filed in the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, the District of Connecticut and the District of New
Jersey. These cases were thereafter transferred to the Western
District of New York by the Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litiga-
tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for consolidated and coordi-
nated pre-trial proceedings.'5 2 All of the cases raise issues as to
the negligence, gross negligence, or reckless conduct of the
flight crew at the controls of Continental Connection Flight
3407 in their operation of the aircraft, as well as to the corporate
defendants' supervision, training, and personnel practices. The
cases have been assigned to the Honorable William M. Skretny,
and the parties anticipate that discovery will begin over the next
several months.
Like the perfect storm, the crash of Continental Connection
Flight 3407 seems to include many of the failures in the regional
airline industry that have occurred over the last twenty years and
may have finally awoken the FAA from a decade of slumber.
Since the crash on February 12, 2009, there has been a loud
public cry for changes in the manner in which regional air carri-
ers operate, stimulated in large measure by the herculean efforts
of the families of the victims to draw attention to the facts associ-
ated with the crash and push legislative leaders for safety
changes. Almost immediately after the crash, the NTSB reiter-
ated calls it had previously made for changes to industry prac-
tices that the FAA failed to implement.' Members of Congress
151 Michael Beebe, Feeder Airline Growth Breeds Corner-Cutting, BuFFALo NEWS,
June 9, 2009, http://www.buffalonews.com/2009/06/697390/feeder-airline-
growth-breeds-corner.html; Cordes, supra note 150.
152 Transfer Order, In reAir Crash Near Clarence Center, New York, on Febru-
ary 12, 2009, MDL No. 2085 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 6, 2009).
153 See, e.g., NTSB Safety Recommendations A-07-04; A-07-08; A-07-09; A-07-10;
and A-07-1 1, dated Jan. 23, 2007; A-07-13 and A-07-14, dated Feb. 27, 2007; A-06-
48; A-06-51, dated July 10, 2006; A-03-53; A-03-54, dated Dec. 2, 2003; A-98-90; A-
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convened hearings in both the House and the Senate to draft
legislation to address the failures.15 4 On June 15, 2009, FAA Ad-
ministrator Randy Babbitt launched what he termed an industry-
wide "Call to Action" designed to finally implement the single
level of safety mandated by the agency more than a dozen years
ago, bringing together representatives from regional and major
air carriers to establish voluntary safety initiatives.'- In October
2009, the House passed the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Im-
provement Act of 2009, which was designed to improve pilot
98-91; A-98-95; A-98-96; A-98-97; A-98-101; A-98-102; and A-98-103, dated Nov. 30,
1998; A-94-184 dated Nov. 7, 1994; NTSB Safety Alert, SA-014 Dec. 2008.
154 Following the NTSB hearings in May 2009, the U.S. House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure Aviation Subcommittee held a hearing on
June 11, 2009, to address "regional air carriers and pilot workforce issues" and
another on September 23, 2009, to examine the FAA's Call to Action program.
Regional Air Carriers and Pilot Workforce Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Avia-
tion of the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. vii (2009); The
Federal Aviation Administration's Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infra-
structure, 111th Cong. vi (2009). The U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation's Subcommittee on Aviation, Operations, Safety and
Security held a hearing on June 10, 2009 to look at the FAA's role in the over-
sight of commercial air carriers. Aviation Safety: FAA's Role in the Oversight of Com-
mercial Air Carriers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation Operations, Safety and
Security of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 111th Cong. 1
(2009) (statement of the Honorable Mark V. Rosenker, Acting Chairman, Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board). On June 17, 2009, it reconvened to focus
on the role and responsibility of commercial air carriers. Aviation Safety: The Role
and Responsibilities of Commercial Air Carriers and Employees: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation Operations, Safety and Security of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of James C. May, President
and CEO, Air Transport Association of America, Inc. (ATA)). The Subcommit-
tee also heard from witnesses on August 6, 2009, to hear discussion on the rela-
tionship between the regional and major air carriers, and its last Subcommittee
hearing was held on December 1, 2009, to hear testimony in connection with
pilot fatigue. See Aviation Safety: The Relationship Between Network Airlines and Re-
gional Airlines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation Operations, Safety and Security
of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 111th Cong. (2009); Avia-
tion Safety: Pilot Fatigue: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation Operations, Safety
and Security of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 111th Cong.
(2009).
155 Frances Fiorino, Industry Debate Focuses on Flightcrew Training, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Nov. 27, 2009, available at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp-
includes/articlePrintjsp?storylD=news/awl13009pl.xml&headLine=NUlI. After
the initial meeting with representatives from all corners of the airline industry,
the FAA announced an expedited review of flight and rest rules and a program to
expand access to pilots' flying records by modifying the Pilot Records Improve-
ment Act. In addition, the FAA has instructed those carriers who do not have
Flight Operations Quality Assurance and Aviation Safety Action Programs in
place to institute them as soon as possible. Id.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
training practices, examine the serious issue of pilot fatigue,
raise the minimum number of flight hours required for first of-
ficers by requiring an ATP license for the position, and establish
an electronic pilot-records data base.'15  The Senate passed its
version entitled the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and
Safety Improvement Act on March 22, 2010, and both bills are
currently being reconciled.1 5 7 The families of the victims of
Continental Connection Flight 3407 have made more than
twenty-five trips to Washington, DC since the crash to advocate
for mandated safety changes so that other families do not find
themselves in the same position.1 58
While the FAA's "Call to Action" and Congress' promises to
bring changes to the regional airline industry1 5 9 are important
steps, they are mired down by numerous political agendas.
While legislators meet and garner photo opportunities, the dan-
gerous conditions that have resulted in the deaths of hundreds
of airline passengers remain the same. Unfortunately, real
change is unlikely to occur at individual airlines until there are
punitive consequences for their decisions to continue to con-
duct their operations in a "business as usual" manner. While it
is true that significant change will cost the industry money, its
failure to institute the desperately needed safety changes that
have resulted in deadly air disasters leaves them susceptible to
punitive damage claims in the lawsuits that arise out of these
crashes.
II. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Like many other plaintiffs who have filed wrongful death suits
following the deaths of their loved ones in many of the regional
air disasters discussed in this article, the families of those killed
on board Continental Connection Flight 3407 have alleged pu-
156 See Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 3371,
111th Cong. (2009). One provision of the bill would require the FAA to ensure
that Part 121 carriers train pilots to recognize and recover from stalls and upsets.
Id. § 4(a).
157 See FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act, S.
1451, 111th Cong. (2009) (authorizing the FAA's financial appropriations for
fiscal years 2010 and 2011).
158 Jerry Zremski, Flight 3407 Families Aim Lobbying at All Senators, BuFFALo
NEws, Mar. 7, 2010, http://www.buffalonews.com/2010/03/03/975142/flight-
3407-families-aim-lobbying.html.
159 Ramon Lopez, FAA Boss Promises Action on Pilot Fatigue; More News, AVIATION
TODAY, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.aviationtoday.com/regions/usa/FAA-Boss-
Promises-Action-on-pilot-Fatigue-More-News_34334.html.
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nitive damage claims in their complaints based upon the facts
and circumstances that permitted the crash to occur. As will be
discussed below, under the current state of the law, it is clear
that each plaintiff is entitled to have his or her compensatory
and punitive damage claims heard by the same jury. 0
Several Supreme Court decisions over the last twenty years
have addressed constitutional due process concerns and the
sizes of jury punitive damage awards arising out of different le-
gal claims.16 1 In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, which
made its way to the Court in 1991, the Justices considered the
effect of the Due Process Clause on the size of a punitive dam-
age award made in a fraud action brought by a woman who
learned she was uninsured as a result of the actions of an agent
and her health insurer, which caused her to be personally liable
for medical treatment she had received.16 2 After a jury trial in
an Alabama state court, the plaintiff was awarded $200,000 in
compensatory and $840,000 in punitive damages, which was af-
firmed thereafter by the Alabama Supreme Court.16 s After de-
termining that the defendants had received the constitutional
protections provided by Alabama law, the U.S. Supreme Court
endorsed the Alabama Supreme Court's standards for assessing
a punitive award, including the need to analyze whether there
was a "reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's con-
duct as well as the harm that actually has occurred" before ulti-
mately upholding the trial court's 4-to-1 punitive to
compensatory ratio.'64
Two years later, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., which arose out of an action to quiet title based upon a
quitclaim deed, the Supreme Court upheld a West Virginia
jury's award of $19,000 in compensatory damages to the defen-
dant on its counterclaim for slander, which reflected the cost of
defending the quiet title action and a $10 million dollar puni-
tive damage award.'6 5 In so doing, the Supreme Court reiter-
10 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432
(2001).
161 See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1998); Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996).
162 499 U.S. at 5-6, 17.
163 Id. at 5-7.
- Id. at 19, 21-24.
-65 509 U.S. at 447, 451.
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ated its reasoning in Haslip, and looked with favor at a decision
out of the West Virginia Supreme Court, which stated that as "a
matter of fundamental fairness, punitive damages should bear a
reasonable relationship to compensatory damages."' 6 6 The
Court acknowledged the large amount of the punitive damage
award in the case, but noted that it was not "so 'grossly excessive'
as to be beyond the power of the State to allow" it in light of the
significant amount of royalty payments disputed in the underly-
ing case and the bad faith and scheme of "fraud, trickery and
deceit" involved.1 6 7
In 1996, the Supreme Court looked at the size of a punitive
damage award in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. 1 6 In Gore,
an Alabama jury awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in compensatory
damages for BMW's conduct in representing that the car it sold
to him was new when in fact it had been repainted after being
damaged prior to delivery, and $4 million dollars in punitive
damages based upon a determination that the company had in
place a non-disclosure policy which constituted "gross, oppres-
sive or malicious" conduct under Alabama law.16' During trial,
the plaintiff produced evidence that BMW had a policy of not
telling purchasers about pre-sale repairs that cost less than 3%
of the value of the vehicle, and he also produced evidence that
the repair to his vehicle reduced its value by $4,000, which was
10% of its cost as new.17 0 The plaintiff calculated his request for
punitive damages at $4 million dollars by multiplying his $4,000
actual damages by the 1,000 cars BMW had sold to other cus-
tomers as new without disclosing that they had been re-
painted.1 7 1 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court applied the
U.S. Supreme Court's Haslip criteria and rejected the defen-
dant's claim that the award was constitutionally impermissible,
although it nevertheless ordered a remittitur of the punitive
award to $2 million dollars, since it believed the jury had im-
properly included BMW's conduct in other jurisdictions when
calculating its punitive damage award. 1 2
166 Id. at 459 (citing Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909
(1991).
167 Id. at 462.
168 517 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1996).
169 Id. at 564-65.
170 Id. at 563-64.
171 Id. at 564.
172 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (1994).
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While it agreed with the reasoning of the Alabama Supreme
Court as it pertains to the state's lack of authority to penalize a
defendant for conduct in other jurisdictions,17 3 the U.S. Su-
preme Court concluded that the $2 million dollar punitive dam-
age award, which was still 500 times the amount of the actual
damages, was constitutionally excessive in light of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the claim.1 74 To provide courts with
guidance when analyzing the amount of punitive damage
awards, the Court established three guideposts for review: (1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2)
the disparity between the plaintiff's harm and the punitive dam-
age award; and (3) the difference between that remedy and civil
penalties imposed in comparative cases.17 5 After applying these
guideposts to the facts in the case, the Court concluded that the
punitive damage award was excessive since the first guidepost,
i.e. degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, was
mitigated by the fact that the harm to the plaintiff was one that
was purely economic, 176 and there was no evidence in the record
of intentional false statements, affirmative misconduct, or con-
cealment of evidence of the defendant's improper motive,
which were at issue in Haslip and TXO.1 77 With respect to the
second guidepost, the Court cited a long history of courts
throughout the country adhering to the principle that punitive
damages "must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to compensa-
tory damages,""17 and it reiterated its decisions in both Haslip
173 The Supreme Court did recognize, however, that evidence of out-of-state
conduct may be relevant for determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 n.21.
174 Id. at 574.
175 Id. at 574-75. According to the Court, the reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct is the most important indicator as to the reasonableness of a punitive
damage award. Id. at 575-76.
176 Id. at 576.
177 Id. at 579.
178 Id. at 580 & n.32 (citing Saunders v. Mullen, 24 N.W. 529 (Iowa 1885)
("When the actual damages are so small, the amount allowed as exemplary dam-
ages should not be so large."); Flannery v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 15 D.C. (4
Mackey) 111, 125 (D.C. 1885) ("[W]hen punitive damages award 'is out of all
proportion to the injuries received, we feel it our duty to interfere."'); Houston &
Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Nichols, 9 Am. & Eng. R.R. Cas. 361, 365 (Tex. 1882)
("Exemplary damages, when allowed, should bear proportion to the actual dam-
ages sustained."); McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90, 91-92 (1875) ("punitive
damages 'enormously in excess of what mayjustly be regarded as compensation'
for the injury must be set aside 'to prevent injustice"'); Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La.
Ann. 447, 448 (La. 1852) ("[E]xemplary damages allowed should bear some pro-
portion to the real damage sustained.")).
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and TXO, which supported the proposition that a comparison
between the compensatory award and the punitive award is a
significant factor.'7 9 The Court did, however, soundly reject the
idea that the constitutional line could be marked by a "simple
mathematical formula" and made a point of observing that "low
awards of compensatory damages" might "support a higher ratio
than high compensatory awards," particularly when an egre-
gious act resulted in relatively low economic damages, when the
injury was "hard to detect," or "the monetary value of
noneconomic harm [was] difficult to determine."10
In 2003, the Supreme Court again examined the excessive-
ness of a punitive damage award, this time in connection with a
bad faith claim made against an automobile insurer who refused
to proffer its $50,000 policy limits in an automobile accident
which resulted in the death of a driver and serious permanent
disability of another driver who were involved in a collision due
to the negligence of its insured."" State Farm Mutual Auto Insur-
ance Co. v. Campbell made its way to the Supreme Court after a
jury returned a verdict against the Campbells in connection with
the crash, and their insurance company, State Farm, responded
by instructing them to put their house up for sale to satisfy the
judgment.1 8 2 The Campbells appealed and State Farm paid the
judgment after it was affirmed by the Utah appellate court.'8 3
After reaching an agreement with the injured parties not to seek
satisfaction of their claims from them personally, the Campbells
instituted a bad faith action against the insurer.'8 4 Following a
bifurcated trial on the bad faith claim,' 5 the jury held that State
Farm's refusal to settle the wrongful death and personal injury
claims was unreasonable in light of the substantial likelihood of
a verdict in excess of the policy limits."" The jury responded
with an award of $2.6 million dollars in emotional distress com-
17 Id. at 581.
180 Id. at 582-83.
181 538 U.S. 408, 412-13 (2003).
182 Id. at 413.
183 Id. at 414.
184 Id. at 413. Evidence was produced during trial demonstrating State Farm
had instituted a nationwide program to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping
claim payments. Id. at 420.
185 The first phase of the trial was held to determine whether State Farm's
decision not to settle was unreasonable in light of the "substantial likelihood of
an excess verdict." The second phase was conducted to determine State Farm's
liability for both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 414.
186 Id. at 414.
348 [ 75
2010] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS - AIR CARRIER
pensatory damages and a punitive damage award of $145 mil-
lion dollars.1 8' The trial court reduced the awards to $1 million
dollars in compensatory and $25 million in punitive damages.'8 8
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court applied the Gore guide-
posts and reinstated the original award after concluding that the
insurer's conduct was reprehensible."8
Finding that it was error for the appellate court to reinstate
the jury's original punitive damage award based upon a desire to
expose and punish deficiencies in State Farm's national opera-
tions, rather than for reprehensible conduct directed toward the
Campbells,' the Court reemphasized that a state generally
does not have a legitimate interest in punishing unlawful acts
committed outside of its jurisdiction. 9 ' When looking at the
second of the Gore guideposts, the Court again declined to iden-
tify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between compen-
satory and punitive damages.' 2 While noting that the Court
had never imposed "rigid benchmarks" beyond which punitive
damage awards may not pass, it did restate its position in Gore,
which suggested that ratios greater than those it had previously
upheld "may comport with due process where 'a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic
damages.""" Significantly, the Court again stressed the re-
quirement that "courts must ensure that the measure of punish-
ment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of
harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered."' 9 4
After observing that the emotional harm suffered by the
187 Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (2001), re-
versed by State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 403 (2003).
188 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 414.
18 Id. at 415-16. The Court found, among other things, that State Farm em-
ployees had altered company records to make it appear as if the Campbells were
less culpable in the underlying crash, and it held this conduct sufficient to sup-
port a punitive award. Id. at 419-20.
-9o Id. at 418, 420.
191 Id. at 421-22. The Court did, however, express the need to continue to
preserve the relevance of out-of-state conduct to "demonstrate[ ] the deliberate-
ness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortious
[provided the] conduct [has] a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plain-
tiff." Id. at 422.
192 Id. at 424-25. The Court did note, however, that "in practice, few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process." Id. at 425.
193 Id. at 425 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581-83
(1996)).
194 Id. at 426.
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Campbells arose not from a physical assault or trauma, but from
an economic transaction that resulted in a $1 million dollar
award for a year and a half of emotional distress, the Court con-
cluded that a ratio of 145-to-1 was neither reasonable nor pro-
portionate to the harm they suffered.195 The case was remanded
back to the Utah state court to determine the appropriate
amount of the punitive damage award."' Upon remand, the
Utah Supreme Court held that $9,018,780.75, or approximately
nine times the compensatory award, was appropriate, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 7
Several years passed until the Supreme Court again delivered
a decision dealing with the size of a punitive damage award. Ex-
xon Shipping Co. v. Baker began its long legal odyssey shortly after
the oil supertanker ran aground on Bligh Reef in the Prince
William Sound in Alaska on March 24, 1989.198 Shortly before
its grounding, its grossly intoxicated captain walked out of the
tanker's bridge."' The ship's hull split open and caused an un-
precedented and catastrophic spill of millions of gallons of
crude oil into Prince William Sound. 20 0 By the time the case
made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, the punitive damage
award made in the initial trial had been remanded three
times. 201 The trial judge entered a $4.5 billion dollar punitive
'95 Id. at 426-29. The Court gave only a cursive review of the third Gore guide-
post, which instructs a court to look at the disparity between a punitive damage
award and potential civil penalties since the most relevant civil sanction under
Utah state law for the harm done to the Campbells was a $10,000 fraud statute,
which paled in comparison to the $145 million dollar punitive damage verdict.
Id. at 428.
196 Id. at 428-29.
197 Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 98 F.3d 409, 420 (2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 874 (2004).
198 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008).
199 Id. at 2612.
200 Id. at 2612-13.
201 Prior to this decision, Exxon had paid more than $1 billion dollars to settle
state and federal claims for environmental damage, after spending approximately
$2.1 billion in cleanup efforts and paying several hundred million dollars in fines
and restitution. Id. at 2613. The action, which resulted in the Supreme Court
decision in 2008, was a class action filed by approximately 32,000 commercial
fisherman and native Alaskans to recover economic losses to individuals who de-
pended on Prince William Sound for their livelihoods. Id. at 2611-13. Interest-
ing, although not discussed in the Supreme Court's decision, is the fact that
Exxon itself stood to share in the punitive damages award pursuant to a deal it
entered into with seafood processors, which came to be known as the "Seattle
Seven" years earlier. See In re The Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir.
2000). The Seattle Seven settled their claims with Exxon for $64 million dollars
prior to the liability trial, agreed not to execute on any compensatory damages
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damage award against the oil company in 2004.202 The Ninth
Circuit twice vacated and remanded for adjustments to the size
of the punitive award in light of the Supreme Court's punitive
damage decisions dealing with due process constitutional pro-
tections before ultimately remitting the award to $2.5 billion
dollars.203
Exxon filed a legal challenge as to the size of the remaining
$2.5 billion dollar punitive damage award." In a detailed anal-
ysis of the history and dual goals behind punitive damage awards
discussing the need to deter a defendant's reckless or harmful
conduct and also provide retribution to an injured plaintiff,2 0 5
Justice Souter noted that, in a tort context, punitive damages are
generally limited to circumstances "where a defendant's con-
duct is 'outrageous,' owing to 'gross negligence,' [or] 'willful,
wanton, and reckless indifference for the rights of others."'
2 06
He described reckless conduct as neither intentional, malicious,
nor "necessarily callous toward the risk of harming others, as
opposed to unheedful of it,"2 0 ' and stated that larger punitive-
damage awards may be justifiable when a defendant's wrongdo-
ing is hard to detect so as to increase its chance of escaping
responsibility or "when the value of injury and the correspond-
ing compensatory" damages are small.20 s While acknowledging
award, and also agreed to cede back to Exxon any punitive damages they might
recover as a result of the litigation. Id. Under the terms of this cede-back provi-
sion, Exxon would receive almost 15% of the punitive damages award, a fact it
chose not to disclose to the court and the jury making the assessment. See id. at
794-95. Upon learning this, the trial judge struck the cede-back provision since
he was angered that Exxon had failed to tell the jury "'the whole story."' Id.
Both Exxon and the Seattle Seven appealed, and the Ninth Circuit vacated and
reversed the trial court, holding that cede-back agreements are lawful and en-
forceable, and generally not disclosable to a jury. See id. at 790, 800.
202 In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1110 (D. Alaska 2004), opinion
after remand, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated, 472 F.3d 600 (9th
Cir. 2006), amended by, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
203 In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 601, 625 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490
F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008); In re The Exxon
Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007); In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215,
1246-47 (9th Cir. 2001).
204 Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
205 Id. at 2621 n.9 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 416 (2003)).
206 Id. at 2621 (quoting 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977));
1 L. SCHLEUTER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 9.3(A) (5th ed. 2005)).
207 Id. at 2621-22 (citing 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, cmt. a
(1964)).
208 Id. at 2622 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
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the difficulties juries may face in the absence of express guide-
lines for making punitive damage awards, the Court specifically
rejected the option of establishing a hard-dollar punitive cap,
noting that there is simply no standard tort "making it difficult
to settle upon a particular dollar figure" that would be appropri-
ate in all cases under all circumstances.2 09 Instead, the Court
elected to follow its earlier precedent that had established prin-
ciples and guidelines as to the outer limits of constitutionality,
and it held that it was appropriate to peg punitive damages to
compensatory damages in civil cases to a multiplier or ratio.21 o
Applying the facts of the Exxon Valdez case to a federal mari-
time law context in his analysis, Justice Souter noted that the
case did not involve intentional or malicious conduct and was
one in which the behavior at issue was not driven primarily by
the desire for gain.2 1 1 He was also careful to note that the plain-
tiffs' losses in the suit were commercial in nature.1 2 This is an
important observation, since it meant that the Court was not re-
quired to do a detailed analysis of two of the relative reprehensi-
bility factors it had previously established to be "[t]he most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award."2 1  The Court ultimately determined that the maximum
punitive damage award allowable in a maritime law context was
209 Id. at 2629.
210 Id. (citing 2 ALI ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: REPORT-
ERS' STUDY 258 (1991) ("[T]he compensatory award in a successful case should
be the starting point in calculating the punitive award"); ABA, REPORT OF SPECIAL
COMM. ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES, SECTION OF LITIGATION, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CON-
STRUCTIVE EXAMINATION 64-66 (1986) ("recommending a presumptive punitive-
to-compensatory damages ratio")). In reaching this conclusion, the Court found
support in the fact that a ratio or multiplier model had been adopted by many
states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-21(a), (d) (2005) (greater of 3:1 or $1.5 mil-
lion in most personal injury suits, and 3:1 or $500,000 in most other actions);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1) (a) (2007) (1:1); Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.265(1)
(2008) (greater of 5:1 or $500,000 in most cases); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-
11(4) (2007) (greater of 2:1 or $250,000). The Court also found support in anal-
ogous legislation enacted by Congress, which has provided for treble damages in
antitrust, racketeering, patent and trademark actions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 1117
(2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
211 128 S. Ct. at 2633.
212 Id.
215 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (quot-
ing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). The Court discussed
the need to weigh five specific considerations when evaluating a punitive damage
award's reasonableness including (1) whether "the harm caused was physical as
opposed to economic," and (2) whether the conduct causing the plaintiffs harm
showed "indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others."
Id.
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one that was equal to the jury's $507.5 million dollar compensa-
tory damage award. 14
III. COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
MUST BE AWARDED AT THE SAME TIME
BY THE SAME JURY
As is the case in the Continental Connection Flight 3407 liti-
gation that is being litigated in the Western District of New York,
cases arising out of the crash of a commercial airliner are typi-
cally transferred to a single jurisdiction by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation so that pre-trial proceedings may be con-
ducted in a single forum. Counsel representing defendants in
similar aviation disaster cases have argued to judges managing
the cases that judicial efficiency is best served by conducting a
single liability trial in the same jurisdiction so they can avoid
being subjected to multiple trials in the various jurisdictions in
which the plaintiffs originally filed their lawsuits.
The significance of Exxon Valdez and its predecessors does not
rest on the Supreme Court's reasoning as to the size of individ-
ual punitive damage awards but, rather, on language in the
cases that plainly calls for compensatory and punitive damages
to be awarded by the same fact-finder at the same time. 15 More-
over, these decisions mandate that there has to be a reasonable
relationship between compensatory and punitive damage
awards, which can only be achieved through the use of an arith-
metic multiplier or ratio.21I To achieve this constitutional man-
date, it is necessary for ajury to assess a defendant's liability for
the crash, and that same jury must also determine whether the
conduct of the defendant, evidence of which they have received
during the liability phase of a trial, gives rise to a punitive dam-
age award. Finally, to insure that the awards adhere to the Su-
preme Court's reasonable relationship criteria, that same jury
must hear all of the damage evidence on behalf of every one of
214 128 S. Ct. at 2633-34. See also In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1060,
1063 (D. Alaska 2002), opinion after remand, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska
2004), vacated, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir.
2007), vacated, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
215 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432
(2001).
216 Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 ("[a] comparison between the compensatory award
and the punitive award is significant."); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426 ("[c]ourts
must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportion-
ate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages
recovered.").
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the plaintiffs who has filed wrongful death suits, thereby impos-
ing a heavy burden on the jurors. Any attempt to try fault for
punitive damages before a jury that has heard evidence of a de-
fendant's liability and the actual amount of punitive damages
before a different jury could potentially violate Seventh Amend-
ment protections since two separate juries would be adjudicat-
ing interwoven claims."
No appellate court has wrestled with the practical implications
that are presented as a result of the Supreme Court's punitive
damage mandates in the context of an aviation disaster. Prior to
the Gore and State Farm decisions, trial courts managing these
types of cases tended to bifurcate issues related to liability and
punitive and compensatory damages at a trial .21  The only fed-
eral trial court to grapple with this problem in a case arising out
of the crash of a commercial airliner is that of the Honorable
Karl S. Forester from the Eastern District of Kentucky in connec-
tion with the crash of Comair Flight 5191 .219 All of the passen-
gers' wrongful death cases were transferred to Judge Forester
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), so there was never a need for
him to consider the possibility that some cases would be re-
quired to be transferred back to their original jurisdictions at
the conclusion of consolidated pre-trial proceedings.2
As the trial date in the case approached in the summer of
2008, Judge Forester recognized that because there were viable
punitive damage claims in the case, it would be necessary to es-
tablish a construct under which the case could proceed to trial
and still adhere to the Supreme Court's requirement that there
be a reasonable relationship between the punitive and compen-
satory damages each family was entitled to receive. He was
aware that the evidence of the defendants' negligence
217 The Seventh Amendment states: "In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by ajury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
218 See, e.g., Andrew C. Jayne, The Impact of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Punitive
Damages Jurisprudence on Oklahoma's Punitive Damages Statute and Juy Instructions,
57 OraA. L. REV. 873, 892-93 (2004).
219 All of the wrongful death suits filed by the families of the passengers who
were killed on board Comair Flight 5191 have been resolved with the exception
of a single case. Judge Forester continues to preside over that case. The authors
served as leading counsel for the Plaintiffs Executive Committee for the case.
220 E.g., Fahey v. Comair, Inc., No. 07-2002-KVH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32954,
at *4-5, 7 (D. Kan. May 3, 2007).
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presented by the plaintiffs during a trial would, by necessity, in-
clude the degree of negligence that could support liability for
punitive damages under Kentucky law. He was also aware that if
he attempted to carve out the issue of the defendants' gross neg-
ligence from a jury's consideration of the appropriate amount
of compensatory damages a family was entitled to receive, it
would require a plaintiff to present all of the liability evidence
twice, to two juries, which created potential Seventh Amend-
ment issues. He was also mindful of the enormous burden that
could be imposed upon a single jury being asked to sit in service
until all of the liability, punitive, and compensatory damage
claims for each of the 49 decedents' families were resolved.
Faced with the reality that under Supreme Court precedent,
each family was entitled to have its own trial as to the defend-
ants' liability and the amount of their compensatory and puni-
tive damages, Judge Forester sought to establish a procedure to
facilitate settlement discussions between the parties while re-
maining in line with the Supreme Court's directives in the event
the cases could not be resolved. In an unreported opinion, he
ordered the parties to try three exemplar cases on all issues and
stated that he anticipated that good faith settlement negotia-
tions would take place once there was a determination in the
exemplar cases.2 2 1
In addition to trying to bring the parties to a resolution by
settlement and hopefully avoid the need for multiple trials on
liability and punitive and compensatory damages, Judge For-
ester offered the parties two possible solutions. First, in the
event the exemplar cases produced a punitive damage finding
and formula, he suggested that the parties could, if they desired,
agree to adopt its use in future cases. 2 Second, he recom-
mended that, in the event that there was no punitive finding
during the exemplar trials, the parties could agree that this find-
ing would be binding on future trials.2 23 The problem with this
approach, obviously, is the fact that it is voluntary in nature and
requires plaintiffs to give up their right to their own trial as to
the defendants' liability and their responsibility for both puni-
tive and compensatory damages, which is really not a solution to
the problem. Following the Court's decision, all but one of the
221 See In re Air Crash at Lexington at Kentucky, August 27, 2006, No. 5:06-cv-
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wrongful death passenger cases were resolved by settlements,
which eliminated the need to determine the manner as to how
the cases could be tried.
It is important to note again that all of the cases arising out of
the crash of Comair Flight 5191 were either originally filed in
the Eastern District of Kentucky or transferred to that jurisdic-
tion subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) .224 The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation declined to grant a transfer pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1407 to the few cases originally filed outside of the
Eastern District of Kentucky.2 2 5 Wat is generally more com-
monplace, and is the case in the litigation arising out of the
crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407, is that cases filed
following an air disaster are subject to a transfer order from the
Judicial Panel under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which transfers the cases
to a single jurisdiction for the purpose of conducting the pre-
trial proceedings.226 As a result, the plaintiffs affected by the
Order of the Judicial Panel in the Continental Connection
Flight 3407 case are entitled, under the unambiguous terms of
the statute itself and the Supreme Court's instruction in Lexecon,
to a remand order returning them to their original jurisdictions
when the pre-trial proceedings are concluded.2 2 7 Regardless of
where the cases are tried, based upon the current state of the
law, the complex issue as to how the families' claims will be tried
remains to be determined.
224 E.g., Fahey, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32954, at *7.
225 Id. at *2.
226 Id. at *4-5.
227 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28
(1998).
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